Identity
0
F
abc.xyz
Posture Score: 58/100
Scanned May 15, 2026 at 1:35 AM UTC
Attack Surface
94
Reputation
80
Identity Findings
Open recursion on nameserver: ns4.google.com
The nameserver ns4.google.com allows recursive queries from external sources, making it vulnerable to DNS amplification attacks.
💡 Disable recursion on ns4.google.com or restrict it to trusted networks only.
Open recursion on nameserver: ns2.google.com
The nameserver ns2.google.com allows recursive queries from external sources, making it vulnerable to DNS amplification attacks.
💡 Disable recursion on ns2.google.com or restrict it to trusted networks only.
Open recursion on nameserver: ns3.google.com
The nameserver ns3.google.com allows recursive queries from external sources, making it vulnerable to DNS amplification attacks.
💡 Disable recursion on ns3.google.com or restrict it to trusted networks only.
Open recursion on nameserver: ns1.google.com
The nameserver ns1.google.com allows recursive queries from external sources, making it vulnerable to DNS amplification attacks.
💡 Disable recursion on ns1.google.com or restrict it to trusted networks only.
Subdomains have no DMARC enforcement
No sp= tag set and p=none. Subdomains inherit the monitoring-only policy, leaving them open to spoofing.
💡 Add sp=reject (or sp=quarantine) to your DMARC record to protect subdomains.
Inconsistent SOA serials across nameservers
Nameservers return different SOA serial numbers, indicating zone transfer lag or failure.
💡 Verify zone transfers are working correctly between primary and secondary nameservers.
SOA serial mismatch across nameservers
Nameservers report different SOA serial numbers, indicating zone transfer lag or failure.
💡 Check zone transfer configuration and ensure all secondary nameservers are receiving updates.
DMARC policy is monitoring-only (p=none)
The p=none policy only monitors; it does not instruct receivers to quarantine or reject unauthenticated mail.
💡 Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing aggregate reports.
No MTA-STS record found
Without MTA-STS, mail transport encryption cannot be enforced and is vulnerable to downgrade attacks.
💡 Publish a _mta-sts TXT record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.abc.xyz/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
STARTTLS without MTA-STS or DANE protection
STARTTLS alone is vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Neither MTA-STS nor DANE is configured to enforce encryption.
💡 Deploy MTA-STS and/or DANE to protect against STARTTLS stripping attacks.
SOA expire value too short
The SOA expire value is 1800s (<604,800s / 7 days). Secondary nameservers may stop serving the zone prematurely.
💡 Increase the SOA expire value to at least 604800 seconds (7 days).
Single MX record — no redundancy
Only one MX record exists. If this mail server goes down, all inbound mail will bounce. Most production mail systems use 2+ MX records with different priorities.
💡 Add a secondary MX record with a higher priority number (e.g., priority 20) pointing to a backup mail server.
No TLS-RPT record found
Without TLS-RPT, you will not receive reports about TLS negotiation failures.
💡 Publish a _smtp._tls TXT record (e.g. "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@abc.xyz").
No CAA iodef tag configured
No iodef tag is present in the CAA records. CA policy violation reports will not be sent.
💡 Add an iodef CAA record. Example: 0 iodef "mailto:security@example.com"
Very low TTL on MX record: 282s
The MX record has a TTL of 282s or less (below 300s).
💡 Increase the TTL to at least 300 seconds unless frequent changes are expected.
Very low TTL on DMARC record: 282s
The DMARC record has a TTL of 282s or less (below 300s).
💡 Increase the TTL to at least 300 seconds unless frequent changes are expected.
NS TTL mismatch between parent and authoritative zone
The NS record TTL in the parent zone (~7182s) differs significantly from the authoritative zone (~345600s).
💡 Align NS record TTLs between the parent zone delegation and the authoritative zone.
SPF record is valid
The SPF record is properly configured with valid syntax and within lookup limits.
SPF record length OK (60 bytes)
SPF record is within safe DNS packet size limits.
DKIM cryptographic configuration is compliant
No RFC 8301 compliance issues detected in DKIM key configuration.
All external report destinations authorized
External DMARC report destinations have valid authorization records per RFC 7489 §7.1.
No deprecated DMARCbis tags present
The DMARC record does not use any tags deprecated in DMARCbis (pct, rf, ri).
MX records are valid
All MX records are properly configured.
ARC support likely available
MX server software appears to support ARC headers for authentication preservation.
Meets bulk sender authentication requirements
Domain has SPF, DKIM, and DMARC — meeting Google/Yahoo 2024 bulk sender requirements for email authentication.
SMTP security checks passed
No open relay, VRFY/EXPN, or banner disclosure issues detected.
SMTP RFC 5321 compliance checks passed
The mail server accepts postmaster@ and abuse@ and uses a valid FQDN in EHLO.
IPv6 readiness is good
IPv6 records are present and properly configured.
DKIM key revoked for selector 'google'
The DKIM record has an empty p= tag, indicating the key has been revoked.
DKIM2 not detected
No DKIM key record with v=2 was found across common selectors. DKIM2 is an emerging standard and not yet widely deployed.
DMARC alignment: adkim=r, aspf=r
DKIM alignment is relaxed, SPF alignment is relaxed.
DMARCbis np tag absent
The DMARC record does not include the np (non-existent subdomain policy) tag. Consider adding np=reject to protect non-existent subdomains under DMARCbis.
DMARCbis psd tag absent
The DMARC record does not include the psd (public suffix domain) indicator. Consider adding psd=n to explicitly identify this as an organizational domain.
REQUIRETLS not advertised
The primary MX does not advertise REQUIRETLS (RFC 8689). This is an emerging standard — MTA-STS and DANE provide adequate TLS enforcement for most deployments.
No DANE/TLSA records found
DANE is not configured for any MX server. This is optional but provides strong certificate binding.
No BIMI record found
BIMI is not configured. Your brand logo will not display in supporting email clients.
Open mail ports on smtp.google.com
Detected open mail-related ports: 25
RFC 8058 one-click unsubscribe assessment
DKIM signing is configured. RFC 8058 compliance depends on List-Unsubscribe and List-Unsubscribe-Post headers being included in outbound messages and DKIM signatures.
MX IP network diversity
MX IPs span 3 different /16 networks, providing good diversity.
SOA record parameters
Serial: 914758286, Refresh: 900s, Retry: 900s, Expire: 1800s, Min TTL: 60s
Authorized certificate authorities
CAA records restrict certificate issuance to: pki.goog, letsencrypt.org
Attack Surface Findings
DNSSEC is not enabled
No DNSKEY or DS records were found. DNS responses are not cryptographically authenticated.
💡 Enable DNSSEC by generating DNSKEY records and publishing DS records at the registrar.
DNS ANY query returns 15 record(s)
The DNS server responds to ANY queries with 15 record(s). The low record count limits amplification risk, but ANY responses still aid reconnaissance.
💡 Configure the DNS server to refuse or minimize ANY query responses per RFC 8482.
Domain enumerability: low
The domain has low enumerability. Proper NSEC3 configuration and limited CT exposure reduce the attack surface.
All MX records resolve correctly
No dangling MX records detected — all MX hostnames resolve to valid IP addresses.
Explicit MX records present
The domain has explicit MX records — no implicit A-record fallback delivery.
No internal information leakage detected
No non-routable IP addresses or internal references were found in public DNS records.
1 subdomain(s) discovered for abc.xyz
Subdomains were enumerated via Certificate Transparency logs, DNS wordlist brute-forcing, and DNS record analysis.
0 certificate(s) found in CT logs
Certificate Transparency logs contain 0 certificate(s) for abc.xyz and its subdomains. Each certificate reveals subdomain names.
Wildcard DNS record detected
A wildcard DNS record exists for *.abc.xyz, resolving to 209.85.202.138, 209.85.202.113, 209.85.202.139, 209.85.202.102, 209.85.202.101, 209.85.202.100. Wildcard records make subdomain brute-forcing less effective but may mask misconfigurations.
Microsoft Autodiscover endpoint detected
The Autodiscover endpoint at autodiscover.abc.xyz responded with HTTP 404.
Reputation Findings
SMTP banner mismatch: mx.google.com
The SMTP banner identifies as 'mx.google.com' but the MX hostname is 'smtp.google.com' and PTR resolves to 'dh-in-f26.1e100.net'. Microsoft and other receivers flag this mismatch as suspicious infrastructure.
💡 Configure the SMTP server banner to match the MX hostname or PTR record (smtp.google.com).
Missing Strict-Transport-Security on abc.xyz
The Strict-Transport-Security header is not set on https://abc.xyz.
💡 Add the Strict-Transport-Security header with a max-age of at least 31536000 (1 year) and include the includeSubDomains directive.
Missing Strict-Transport-Security on webmail.abc.xyz
The Strict-Transport-Security header is not set on https://webmail.abc.xyz.
💡 Add the Strict-Transport-Security header with a max-age of at least 31536000 (1 year) and include the includeSubDomains directive.
Domain uses abused TLD: .xyz
The .xyz TLD has disproportionately high rates of spam, phishing, and malware. Mail from this TLD often faces additional scrutiny by receivers.
💡 Consider migrating to a more reputable TLD (.com, .org, .net, country-code TLDs) for better deliverability.
security.txt present
Found security.txt at https://abc.xyz/.well-known/security.txt.
TLS certificate valid for 53 days
Certificate for abc.xyz expires on 2026-07-07.
Certificate issued by WE1
The certificate for abc.xyz is issued by a third-party CA.
Signature algorithm: ecdsa-with-sha256
The certificate for abc.xyz uses an acceptable signature algorithm.
ECC key: 256 bits
The certificate for abc.xyz uses an adequate ECC key of 256 bits.
SCTs present in certificate
The certificate for abc.xyz contains Signed Certificate Timestamps.
No weak ciphers detected
No known weak cipher suites detected on abc.xyz.
Domain valid for 309 days
Domain abc.xyz expires on 2027-03-20.
Domain transfer and delete locks enabled
Domain abc.xyz has clientTransferProhibited and clientDeleteProhibited locks.
DMARC reporting destinations look legitimate
DMARC rua/ruf addresses do not point to known URL shortener services.
MX records point to stable infrastructure
No MX records point to known dynamic DNS service domains.
Strong TLS configuration on primary MX
Primary MX (smtp.google.com) uses TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 including Forward Secrecy.
Google Safe Browsing DNS check — no flag detected
DNS-based Safe Browsing lookup returned no results. Full verification requires the Google Safe Browsing API key.
Abuse contact lookup failed
Could not query abuse contact information.
PhishTank — API key required
PhishTank phishing database check requires an API key.
Sender Score — API key required
Sender Score reputation check requires an API key.
Cisco Talos — API key required
Cisco Talos IP reputation check requires an API key.
WHOIS registration data
Registrar: MarkMonitor, Inc (TLDs) | Created: 2014-03-20 | Expires: 2027-03-20 | Updated: 2026-03-06
WHOIS privacy protection not detected
Domain abc.xyz does not appear to have WHOIS privacy protection. Registrant details may be publicly visible.
Typosquat detected: bc.xyz (has MX!), qbc.xyz (has MX!), wbc.xyz (has MX!), zbc.xyz (has MX!), avc.xyz (has MX!)
23 registered lookalike domain(s) that could be used for phishing against your brand. Showing top 5 of 23. Domains with MX records can send and receive email, making them high-risk phishing vectors.
Dependency Chains
DMARC Authentication Chain (SPF)
DMARC uses SPF to verify that emails come from authorized servers
SPF Record
SPF record found and configured
→
DMARC Policy
DMARC policy: none
DMARC Authentication Chain (DKIM)
DMARC uses DKIM to verify that emails have not been tampered with
DKIM Signature
DKIM signature missing
→
DMARC Policy
DMARC policy: none
⚠️ DKIM signature is missing. DMARC relies on DKIM to verify email integrity and prevent tampering. Without DKIM, DMARC alignment will fail for cryptographic verification.
Mail Server Identity: smtp.google.com
PTR record proves mail server legitimacy
MX: smtp.google.com
Mail server at 74.125.193.27
→
PTR Record
Reverse DNS: ig-in-f27.1e100.net
Mail Server Reputation: smtp.google.com
RBL check ensures server is not blacklisted
MX: smtp.google.com
Mail server at 74.125.193.27
→
RBL Status
Not blacklisted
Enforced Encryption Chain
MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks
TLS Support
Mail servers support TLS encryption
→
MTA-STS Policy
MTA-STS not configured
⚠️ MTA-STS policy is missing. Even with TLS support, you lack the enforcement layer that prevents attackers from stripping encryption (downgrade attacks).
Brand Identity Chain
BIMI displays your logo in email clients, but requires DMARC enforcement
DMARC Enforcement
DMARC not enforced (p=none or missing)
→
BIMI Record
BIMI not configured
⚠️ DMARC is not enforced. BIMI requires a DMARC policy of "quarantine" or "reject" to prove you have strong email authentication. Without enforcement, email clients will not display your logo.
TLS Monitoring Chain
TLS-RPT provides reports about TLS connection failures
TLS Support
Mail servers support TLS encryption
→
TLS-RPT Reporting
TLS-RPT not configured
⚠️ TLS-RPT is not configured. Without TLS reporting, you have no visibility into TLS connection failures that may be impacting email delivery.
Security Checks
MX Records
✓
SPF Record
✓
DKIM Record
✗
DMARC Policy
✓
BIMI Record
✗
CAA Records
✓
DNSSEC
✗
MTA-STS
✗
TLS-RPT
✗
Embed Badge
Display your domain's security grade on your website or README:
<img src="https://scan.ractermx.com/badge/abc.xyz.svg" alt="Email Security Grade">
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