Identity
43
D
house.gov
Posture Score: 64/100
Scanned May 23, 2026 at 10:54 PM UTC
Attack Surface
58
Reputation
92
Identity Findings
No MX records found
The domain has no MX records and cannot receive email.
💡 Publish MX records pointing to your mail server(s).
Weak DKIM RSA key (~1296 bits) for selector 'selector1'
RSA keys shorter than 2048 bits are considered weak. Current key is approximately 1296 bits.
💡 Generate a new 2048-bit (or larger) RSA key pair and update the DKIM record.
External report destination not authorized: mail.house.gov
The rua= URI sends reports to mail.house.gov, but no authorization record exists at house.gov._report._dmarc.mail.house.gov. Reports will be silently dropped by compliant receivers.
💡 Ask the owner of mail.house.gov to publish a TXT record at house.gov._report._dmarc.mail.house.gov containing 'v=DMARC1'.
Subdomains have no DMARC enforcement
No sp= tag set and p=none. Subdomains inherit the monitoring-only policy, leaving them open to spoofing.
💡 Add sp=reject (or sp=quarantine) to your DMARC record to protect subdomains.
DMARC policy is monitoring-only (p=none)
The p=none policy only monitors; it does not instruct receivers to quarantine or reject unauthenticated mail.
💡 Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing aggregate reports.
External DMARC report destination not authorized: mail.house.gov
The rua= URI points to mail.house.gov but no authorization record exists at house.gov._report._dmarc.mail.house.gov.
💡 Ask the owner of mail.house.gov to publish a TXT record at house.gov._report._dmarc.mail.house.gov with 'v=DMARC1'.
No MTA-STS record found
Without MTA-STS, mail transport encryption cannot be enforced and is vulnerable to downgrade attacks.
💡 Publish a _mta-sts TXT record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.house.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
No CAA records found
No CAA records are configured. Any certificate authority can issue certificates for this domain.
💡 Add CAA records to restrict certificate issuance. Example: 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
No TLS-RPT record found
Without TLS-RPT, you will not receive reports about TLS negotiation failures.
💡 Publish a _smtp._tls TXT record (e.g. "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@house.gov").
ARC check skipped — no MX records
Cannot assess ARC support without MX records.
SPF record is valid
The SPF record is properly configured with valid syntax and within lookup limits.
SPF record length OK (11 bytes)
SPF record is within safe DNS packet size limits.
DKIM cryptographic configuration is compliant
No RFC 8301 compliance issues detected in DKIM key configuration.
DKIM key strength indicates modern key management
All DKIM keys use RSA-2048+ or Ed25519, consistent with current best practices.
Meets bulk sender authentication requirements
Domain has SPF, DKIM, and DMARC — meeting Google/Yahoo 2024 bulk sender requirements for email authentication.
IPv6 readiness is good
IPv6 records are present and properly configured.
NS delegation is properly configured
All nameservers are responsive, consistent, and properly secured.
DNS responses are consistent across all nameservers
All authoritative nameservers return consistent answers with proper AA flags.
DNS TTL values follow best practices
All critical DNS record TTLs are within recommended ranges.
DKIM2 not detected
No DKIM key record with v=2 was found across common selectors. DKIM2 is an emerging standard and not yet widely deployed.
DMARC alignment: adkim=r, aspf=r
DKIM alignment is relaxed, SPF alignment is relaxed.
DMARCbis np tag absent
The DMARC record does not include the np (non-existent subdomain policy) tag. Consider adding np=reject to protect non-existent subdomains under DMARCbis.
Deprecated DMARCbis tags found: pct
The DMARC record contains tags deprecated in DMARCbis: pct. Consider removing these for forward compatibility.
DMARCbis psd tag absent
The DMARC record does not include the psd (public suffix domain) indicator. Consider adding psd=n to explicitly identify this as an organizational domain.
DANE check skipped — no MX records
Cannot check DANE/TLSA without MX records.
No BIMI record found
BIMI is not configured. Your brand logo will not display in supporting email clients.
Open relay check skipped — no MX records
Cannot test for open relay without MX records.
SMTP compliance check skipped — no MX records
Cannot test SMTP compliance without MX records.
Port exposure check skipped — no MX records
Cannot scan ports without MX records.
STARTTLS downgrade check skipped — no MX records
Cannot test STARTTLS without MX records.
RFC 8058 one-click unsubscribe assessment
DKIM signing is configured. RFC 8058 compliance depends on List-Unsubscribe and List-Unsubscribe-Post headers being included in outbound messages and DKIM signatures.
FCrDNS check skipped — no MX records
Cannot perform FCrDNS without MX records.
SOA record parameters
Serial: 1556283, Refresh: 10800s, Retry: 900s, Expire: 2419200s, Min TTL: 900s
Attack Surface Findings
Weak DNSSEC RSA key: 336 bits
The DNSKEY uses an RSA key of 336 bits, below the recommended 2048 bits.
💡 Generate a new DNSKEY with at least 2048-bit RSA or migrate to ECDSA/Ed25519.
Weak DNSSEC RSA key: 336 bits
The DNSKEY uses an RSA key of 336 bits, below the recommended 2048 bits.
💡 Generate a new DNSKEY with at least 2048-bit RSA or migrate to ECDSA/Ed25519.
Weak DNSSEC RSA key: 336 bits
The DNSKEY uses an RSA key of 336 bits, below the recommended 2048 bits.
💡 Generate a new DNSKEY with at least 2048-bit RSA or migrate to ECDSA/Ed25519.
Weak DNSSEC RSA key: 336 bits
The DNSKEY uses an RSA key of 336 bits, below the recommended 2048 bits.
💡 Generate a new DNSKEY with at least 2048-bit RSA or migrate to ECDSA/Ed25519.
Weak DNSSEC RSA key: 336 bits
The DNSKEY uses an RSA key of 336 bits, below the recommended 2048 bits.
💡 Generate a new DNSKEY with at least 2048-bit RSA or migrate to ECDSA/Ed25519.
No MX records — A-record fallback active
The domain has no MX records but has an A record. Per RFC 5321, mail servers will attempt delivery to the A record IP. This domain may be silently accepting mail without SPF/DKIM/DMARC protection.
💡 If this domain should not receive mail, publish a Null MX record (RFC 7505): "0 ." as the MX. If it should receive mail, add proper MX records.
Domain enumerability: low
The domain has low enumerability. Proper NSEC3 configuration and limited CT exposure reduce the attack surface.
Non-mail domain correctly publishes SPF -all
This domain has no MX and publishes "v=spf1 -all", preventing spoofing.
No internal information leakage detected
No non-routable IP addresses or internal references were found in public DNS records.
No excessive DNS information exposure detected
No HINFO, LOC, RP records, version disclosures, or zone walking vulnerabilities were found.
No email autodiscovery endpoints detected
No Microsoft Autodiscover, Mozilla Autoconfig, or email SRV records were found.
7 subdomain(s) discovered for house.gov
Subdomains were enumerated via Certificate Transparency logs, DNS wordlist brute-forcing, and DNS record analysis.
0 certificate(s) found in CT logs
Certificate Transparency logs contain 0 certificate(s) for house.gov and its subdomains. Each certificate reveals subdomain names.
NSEC3 authenticated denial of existence
The domain uses NSEC3 with 10 iteration(s) and salt 'F6E8AC97A3CC3C0A52'.
DNSSEC is enabled
DNSKEY and/or DS records are present, indicating DNSSEC is configured.
Reputation Findings
Missing domain locks: clientDeleteProhibited
Domain house.gov is missing protective locks: clientDeleteProhibited.
💡 Enable clientTransferProhibited and clientDeleteProhibited locks through your registrar to prevent unauthorized transfers or deletions.
Not listed on any DNS blacklists
Domain and MX IPs checked against 55 DNSBLs — no listings found.
HSTS enabled with preload on house.gov
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=16000000; includeSubDomains; preload;
security.txt present
Found security.txt at https://house.gov/.well-known/security.txt.
TLS certificate valid for 123 days
Certificate for house.gov expires on 2026-09-23.
Certificate issued by DigiCert Global G2 TLS RSA SHA256 2020 CA1
The certificate for house.gov is issued by a third-party CA.
Signature algorithm: rsa-sha256
The certificate for house.gov uses an acceptable signature algorithm.
RSA key: 2048 bits
The certificate for house.gov uses an adequate RSA key of 2048 bits.
SCTs present in certificate
The certificate for house.gov contains Signed Certificate Timestamps.
No weak ciphers detected
No known weak cipher suites detected on house.gov.
Domain valid for 69 days
Domain house.gov expires on 2026-08-01.
No disposable email provider MX records
MX records for house.gov do not match known disposable email provider patterns.
Domain is 10460 days old
Domain house.gov was registered 1997-10-02.
No wildcard MX records
No wildcard MX records detected for house.gov.
TLD has good reputation
The .gov TLD is not on known abuse watchlists.
DMARC reporting destinations look legitimate
DMARC rua/ruf addresses do not point to known URL shortener services.
No registered typosquat domains detected
None of the common typosquat mutations of this domain appear to be registered by third parties.
Google Safe Browsing DNS check — no flag detected
DNS-based Safe Browsing lookup returned no results. Full verification requires the Google Safe Browsing API key.
No abuse contacts resolved
Could not resolve abuse contact information for MX IPs via abusix.org.
PhishTank — API key required
PhishTank phishing database check requires an API key.
Sender Score — API key required
Sender Score reputation check requires an API key.
Cisco Talos — API key required
Cisco Talos IP reputation check requires an API key.
Could not connect to webmail.house.gov
HTTPS request to https://webmail.house.gov failed or timed out.
WHOIS registration data
Registrar: get.gov | Created: 1997-10-02 | Expires: 2026-08-01 | Updated: 2026-03-12
WHOIS privacy protection enabled
Domain house.gov has WHOIS privacy/redaction enabled.
Bulletproof Hosting Detection — API key required
Checking IPs against known bulletproof hosting providers requires a threat intelligence API key.
Threat Intelligence Feeds — API key required
Checking domain against threat intelligence feeds requires API keys (e.g., VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB).
Dependency Chains
DMARC Authentication Chain (SPF)
DMARC uses SPF to verify that emails come from authorized servers
SPF Record
SPF record found and configured
→
DMARC Policy
DMARC policy: none
DMARC Authentication Chain (DKIM)
DMARC uses DKIM to verify that emails have not been tampered with
DKIM Signature
DKIM signature missing
→
DMARC Policy
DMARC policy: none
⚠️ DKIM signature is missing. DMARC relies on DKIM to verify email integrity and prevent tampering. Without DKIM, DMARC alignment will fail for cryptographic verification.
Enforced Encryption Chain
MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks
TLS Support
TLS not verified or unsupported
→
MTA-STS Policy
MTA-STS not configured
⚠️ TLS support could not be verified. MTA-STS requires TLS to enforce encrypted connections. Without TLS, MTA-STS cannot function.
Brand Identity Chain
BIMI displays your logo in email clients, but requires DMARC enforcement
DMARC Enforcement
DMARC not enforced (p=none or missing)
→
BIMI Record
BIMI not configured
⚠️ DMARC is not enforced. BIMI requires a DMARC policy of "quarantine" or "reject" to prove you have strong email authentication. Without enforcement, email clients will not display your logo.
TLS Monitoring Chain
TLS-RPT provides reports about TLS connection failures
TLS Support
TLS not verified or unsupported
→
TLS-RPT Reporting
TLS-RPT not configured
⚠️ TLS support could not be verified. TLS-RPT reports on TLS connection failures, but without TLS support, there's nothing to monitor. You need working TLS encryption before TLS-RPT can provide value.
Security Checks
MX Records
✗
SPF Record
✓
DKIM Record
✗
DMARC Policy
✓
BIMI Record
✗
CAA Records
✗
DNSSEC
✓
MTA-STS
✗
TLS-RPT
✗
Embed Badge
Display your domain's security grade on your website or README:
<img src="https://scan.ractermx.com/badge/house.gov.svg" alt="Email Security Grade">
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