Identity
80
B
microsoft.com
Posture Score: 84/100
Scanned May 9, 2026 at 4:22 AM UTC
Score History
Attack Surface
88
Reputation
83
Identity Findings
Weak DKIM RSA key (~1296 bits) for selector 'selector2'
RSA keys shorter than 2048 bits are considered weak. Current key is approximately 1296 bits.
💡 Generate a new 2048-bit (or larger) RSA key pair and update the DKIM record.
Inconsistent DNS responses across nameservers
Authoritative nameservers return different answers for the same query.
💡 Verify zone transfers are working correctly and all nameservers serve the same zone data.
Single MX record — no redundancy
Only one MX record exists. If this mail server goes down, all inbound mail will bounce. Most production mail systems use 2+ MX records with different priorities.
💡 Add a secondary MX record with a higher priority number (e.g., priority 20) pointing to a backup mail server.
Unknown CAA tag: contactemail
The CAA record contains an unrecognized tag 'contactemail'.
💡 Review the CAA record and use standard tags (issue, issuewild, iodef).
No CAA iodef tag configured
No iodef tag is present in the CAA records. CA policy violation reports will not be sent.
💡 Add an iodef CAA record. Example: 0 iodef "mailto:security@example.com"
NS TTL mismatch between parent and authoritative zone
The NS record TTL in the parent zone (~7195s) differs significantly from the authoritative zone (~172800s).
💡 Align NS record TTLs between the parent zone delegation and the authoritative zone.
SPF record is valid
The SPF record is properly configured with valid syntax and within lookup limits.
SPF record length OK (158 bytes)
SPF record is within safe DNS packet size limits.
DKIM cryptographic configuration is compliant
No RFC 8301 compliance issues detected in DKIM key configuration.
DKIM key strength indicates modern key management
All DKIM keys use RSA-2048+ or Ed25519, consistent with current best practices.
No external DMARC report destinations
All DMARC report URIs point to the same domain — no external authorization needed.
Subdomains protected (sp=reject)
DMARC subdomain policy enforces quarantine or reject on unauthenticated subdomain mail.
MX records are valid
All MX records are properly configured.
MTA-STS and TLS-RPT are properly configured
MTA-STS policy is enforced and TLS reporting is configured.
TLS-RPT report destinations are reachable
All TLS-RPT rua= URIs point to resolvable domains.
ARC support likely available
MX server software appears to support ARC headers for authentication preservation.
Meets bulk sender authentication requirements
Domain has SPF, DKIM, and DMARC — meeting Google/Yahoo 2024 bulk sender requirements for email authentication.
SMTP security checks passed
No open relay, VRFY/EXPN, or banner disclosure issues detected.
SMTP RFC 5321 compliance checks passed
The mail server accepts postmaster@ and abuse@ and uses a valid FQDN in EHLO.
IPv6 readiness is good
IPv6 records are present and properly configured.
STARTTLS downgrade resistance is adequate
STARTTLS is supported with modern TLS and protected by MTA-STS and/or DANE.
NS delegation is properly configured
All nameservers are responsive, consistent, and properly secured.
DKIM2 not detected
No DKIM key record with v=2 was found across common selectors. DKIM2 is an emerging standard and not yet widely deployed.
DMARC alignment: adkim=r, aspf=r
DKIM alignment is relaxed, SPF alignment is relaxed.
DMARC failure reporting: fo=1
Failure reports generated when any authentication mechanism fails.
DMARCbis np tag absent
The DMARC record does not include the np (non-existent subdomain policy) tag. Consider adding np=reject to protect non-existent subdomains under DMARCbis.
Deprecated DMARCbis tags found: pct
The DMARC record contains tags deprecated in DMARCbis: pct. Consider removing these for forward compatibility.
DMARCbis psd tag absent
The DMARC record does not include the psd (public suffix domain) indicator. Consider adding psd=n to explicitly identify this as an organizational domain.
REQUIRETLS not advertised
The primary MX does not advertise REQUIRETLS (RFC 8689). This is an emerging standard — MTA-STS and DANE provide adequate TLS enforcement for most deployments.
No DANE/TLSA records found
DANE is not configured for any MX server. This is optional but provides strong certificate binding.
No BIMI record found
BIMI is not configured. Your brand logo will not display in supporting email clients.
Open mail ports on microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com
Detected open mail-related ports: 25
RFC 8058 one-click unsubscribe assessment
DKIM signing is configured. RFC 8058 compliance depends on List-Unsubscribe and List-Unsubscribe-Post headers being included in outbound messages and DKIM signatures.
MX IP network diversity
All MX IPs are in the same /16 network. Consider diversifying across networks for resilience.
SOA record parameters
Serial: 1, Refresh: 3600s, Retry: 300s, Expire: 2419200s, Min TTL: 300s
Attack Surface Findings
Domain enumerability: high
The domain is highly enumerable. Zone transfers, NSEC zone walking, or a combination of factors make it easy to discover all DNS records.
💡 Restrict zone transfers, use NSEC3 instead of NSEC, consider wildcard certificates to reduce CT log exposure, and implement rate limiting on DNS queries.
DNSSEC is not enabled
No DNSKEY or DS records were found. DNS responses are not cryptographically authenticated.
💡 Enable DNSSEC by generating DNSKEY records and publishing DS records at the registrar.
All MX records resolve correctly
No dangling MX records detected — all MX hostnames resolve to valid IP addresses.
Explicit MX records present
The domain has explicit MX records — no implicit A-record fallback delivery.
No internal information leakage detected
No non-routable IP addresses or internal references were found in public DNS records.
No excessive DNS information exposure detected
No HINFO, LOC, RP records, version disclosures, or zone walking vulnerabilities were found.
No email autodiscovery endpoints detected
No Microsoft Autodiscover, Mozilla Autoconfig, or email SRV records were found.
3722 subdomain(s) discovered for microsoft.com
Subdomains were enumerated via Certificate Transparency logs, DNS wordlist brute-forcing, and DNS record analysis.
5827 certificate(s) found in CT logs
Certificate Transparency logs contain 5827 certificate(s) for microsoft.com and its subdomains. Each certificate reveals subdomain names.
Reputation Findings
DMARC reports sent to URL shortener domain
DMARC aggregate or forensic reports contain sensitive authentication metadata. Sending them to URL shortener domains indicates misconfiguration or a compromised record.
💡 Change DMARC rua/ruf addresses to a domain you control.
SMTP banner mismatch: bn2pepf00004fbd.mail.protection.outlook.com
The SMTP banner identifies as 'bn2pepf00004fbd.mail.protection.outlook.com' but the MX hostname is 'microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com' and PTR resolves to 'mail-co1pr21cu00207.inbound.protection.outlook.com'. Microsoft and other receivers flag this mismatch as suspicious infrastructure.
💡 Configure the SMTP server banner to match the MX hostname or PTR record (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com).
HSTS enabled but missing preload directive on microsoft.com
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
💡 Add the "preload" directive to the HSTS header and submit the domain to hstspreload.org.
security.txt present
Found security.txt at https://microsoft.com/.well-known/security.txt.
TLS certificate valid for 156 days
Certificate for microsoft.com expires on 2026-10-12.
Certificate issued by Microsoft TLS G2 RSA CA OCSP 02
The certificate for microsoft.com is issued by a third-party CA.
Signature algorithm: rsa-sha384
The certificate for microsoft.com uses an acceptable signature algorithm.
RSA key: 2048 bits
The certificate for microsoft.com uses an adequate RSA key of 2048 bits.
SCTs present in certificate
The certificate for microsoft.com contains Signed Certificate Timestamps.
No weak ciphers detected
No known weak cipher suites detected on microsoft.com.
Domain valid for 358 days
Domain microsoft.com expires on 2027-05-03.
Domain transfer and delete locks enabled
Domain microsoft.com has clientTransferProhibited and clientDeleteProhibited locks.
TLD has good reputation
The .com TLD is not on known abuse watchlists.
MX records point to stable infrastructure
No MX records point to known dynamic DNS service domains.
Strong TLS configuration on primary MX
Primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) uses TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 including Forward Secrecy.
Google Safe Browsing DNS check — no flag detected
DNS-based Safe Browsing lookup returned no results. Full verification requires the Google Safe Browsing API key.
Abuse contact lookup failed
Could not query abuse contact information.
PhishTank — API key required
PhishTank phishing database check requires an API key.
Sender Score — API key required
Sender Score reputation check requires an API key.
Cisco Talos — API key required
Cisco Talos IP reputation check requires an API key.
Could not connect to webmail.microsoft.com
HTTPS request to https://webmail.microsoft.com failed or timed out.
WHOIS registration data
Registrar: MarkMonitor Inc. | Created: 1991-05-02 | Expires: 2027-05-03 | Updated: 2026-01-29
WHOIS privacy protection not detected
Domain microsoft.com does not appear to have WHOIS privacy protection. Registrant details may be publicly visible.
Typosquat detected: imcrosoft.com (has MX!), micorsoft.com (has MX!), micrsooft.com (has MX!), microosft.com (has MX!), midrosoft.com (has MX!)
27 registered lookalike domain(s) that could be used for phishing against your brand. Showing top 5 of 27. Domains with MX records can send and receive email, making them high-risk phishing vectors.
Dependency Chains
DMARC Authentication Chain (SPF)
DMARC uses SPF to verify that emails come from authorized servers
SPF Record
SPF record found and configured
→
DMARC Policy
DMARC policy: reject
DMARC Authentication Chain (DKIM)
DMARC uses DKIM to verify that emails have not been tampered with
DKIM Signature
DKIM signature missing
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DMARC Policy
DMARC policy: reject
⚠️ DKIM signature is missing. DMARC relies on DKIM to verify email integrity and prevent tampering. Without DKIM, DMARC alignment will fail for cryptographic verification.
Mail Server Identity: microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com
PTR record proves mail server legitimacy
MX: microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com
Mail server at 52.101.41.26
→
PTR Record
Reverse DNS: mail-sj0pr03cu01702.inbound.protection.outlook.com
Mail Server Reputation: microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com
RBL check ensures server is not blacklisted
MX: microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com
Mail server at 52.101.41.26
→
RBL Status
Not blacklisted
Enforced Encryption Chain
MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks
TLS Support
Mail servers support TLS encryption
→
MTA-STS Policy
Mode: enforce
Brand Identity Chain
BIMI displays your logo in email clients, but requires DMARC enforcement
DMARC Enforcement
DMARC policy: reject
→
BIMI Record
BIMI not configured
⚠️ BIMI record is missing. Even with DMARC enforcement, you need to configure BIMI to display your brand logo in supported email clients.
TLS Monitoring Chain
TLS-RPT provides reports about TLS connection failures
TLS Support
Mail servers support TLS encryption
→
TLS-RPT Reporting
TLS failure reporting configured
Security Checks
MX Records
✓
SPF Record
✓
DKIM Record
✗
DMARC Policy
✓
BIMI Record
✗
CAA Records
✓
DNSSEC
✗
MTA-STS
✓
TLS-RPT
✓
Embed Badge
Display your domain's security grade on your website or README:
<img src="https://scan.ractermx.com/badge/microsoft.com.svg" alt="Email Security Grade">
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