Identity
44
D
state.gov
Posture Score: 63/100
Scanned May 23, 2026 at 11:08 PM UTC
Score History
Attack Surface
67
Reputation
77
Identity Findings
Weak DKIM RSA key (~1296 bits) for selector 'selector1'
RSA keys shorter than 2048 bits are considered weak. Current key is approximately 1296 bits.
💡 Generate a new 2048-bit (or larger) RSA key pair and update the DKIM record.
Weak DKIM RSA key (~1296 bits) for selector 'selector2'
RSA keys shorter than 2048 bits are considered weak. Current key is approximately 1296 bits.
💡 Generate a new 2048-bit (or larger) RSA key pair and update the DKIM record.
Weak DKIM RSA key (~1296 bits) for selector 's2'
RSA keys shorter than 2048 bits are considered weak. Current key is approximately 1296 bits.
💡 Generate a new 2048-bit (or larger) RSA key pair and update the DKIM record.
Weak DKIM RSA key (~1296 bits) for selector 'cm'
RSA keys shorter than 2048 bits are considered weak. Current key is approximately 1296 bits.
💡 Generate a new 2048-bit (or larger) RSA key pair and update the DKIM record.
DKIM in testing mode for selector 'mail'
The t=y flag indicates DKIM is in testing mode. Receivers may not enforce DKIM failures.
💡 Remove the t=y flag once DKIM signing is verified in production.
No MTA-STS record found
Without MTA-STS, mail transport encryption cannot be enforced and is vulnerable to downgrade attacks.
💡 Publish a _mta-sts TXT record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.state.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
STARTTLS without MTA-STS or DANE protection
STARTTLS alone is vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Neither MTA-STS nor DANE is configured to enforce encryption.
💡 Deploy MTA-STS and/or DANE to protect against STARTTLS stripping attacks.
SOA MNAME does not resolve
The primary nameserver (MNAME) 'o-bimc-dns001.grid.state.sbu' does not resolve to any IP address.
💡 Ensure the MNAME field points to a resolvable, authoritative nameserver.
No CAA records found
No CAA records are configured. Any certificate authority can issue certificates for this domain.
💡 Add CAA records to restrict certificate issuance. Example: 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Void lookup: a:_msiplista.state.gov
The mechanism a:_msiplista.state.gov returns no records, wasting a DNS lookup.
💡 Remove mechanisms that reference non-existent domains.
No TLS-RPT record found
Without TLS-RPT, you will not receive reports about TLS negotiation failures.
💡 Publish a _smtp._tls TXT record (e.g. "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@state.gov").
ARC support not detected
No evidence of ARC (Authenticated Received Chain) support on MX servers. Forwarded messages may lose authentication.
💡 Consider enabling ARC signing on your mail servers to preserve authentication through forwarding.
Very low TTL on MX records: 35s
2 MX records have a TTL of 35s or less (below 300s).
💡 Increase the TTL to at least 300 seconds unless frequent changes are expected.
SPF record length OK (125 bytes)
SPF record is within safe DNS packet size limits.
DKIM cryptographic configuration is compliant
No RFC 8301 compliance issues detected in DKIM key configuration.
DKIM key strength indicates modern key management
All DKIM keys use RSA-2048+ or Ed25519, consistent with current best practices.
All external report destinations authorized
External DMARC report destinations have valid authorization records per RFC 7489 §7.1.
Subdomains protected (sp=reject)
DMARC subdomain policy enforces quarantine or reject on unauthenticated subdomain mail.
No deprecated DMARCbis tags present
The DMARC record does not use any tags deprecated in DMARCbis (pct, rf, ri).
MX records are valid
All MX records are properly configured.
Meets bulk sender authentication requirements
Domain has SPF, DKIM, and DMARC — meeting Google/Yahoo 2024 bulk sender requirements for email authentication.
SMTP security checks passed
No open relay, VRFY/EXPN, or banner disclosure issues detected.
SMTP RFC 5321 compliance checks passed
The mail server accepts postmaster@ and abuse@ and uses a valid FQDN in EHLO.
IPv6 readiness is good
IPv6 records are present and properly configured.
NS delegation is properly configured
All nameservers are responsive, consistent, and properly secured.
DNS responses are consistent across all nameservers
All authoritative nameservers return consistent answers with proper AA flags.
DKIM2 not detected
No DKIM key record with v=2 was found across common selectors. DKIM2 is an emerging standard and not yet widely deployed.
DMARC alignment: adkim=r, aspf=r
DKIM alignment is relaxed, SPF alignment is relaxed.
DMARCbis np tag absent
The DMARC record does not include the np (non-existent subdomain policy) tag. Consider adding np=reject to protect non-existent subdomains under DMARCbis.
DMARCbis psd tag absent
The DMARC record does not include the psd (public suffix domain) indicator. Consider adding psd=n to explicitly identify this as an organizational domain.
REQUIRETLS not advertised
The primary MX does not advertise REQUIRETLS (RFC 8689). This is an emerging standard — MTA-STS and DANE provide adequate TLS enforcement for most deployments.
No DANE/TLSA records found
DANE is not configured for any MX server. This is optional but provides strong certificate binding.
No BIMI record found
BIMI is not configured. Your brand logo will not display in supporting email clients.
Open mail ports on stimson.state.gov
Detected open mail-related ports: 25
RFC 8058 one-click unsubscribe assessment
DKIM signing is configured. RFC 8058 compliance depends on List-Unsubscribe and List-Unsubscribe-Post headers being included in outbound messages and DKIM signatures.
MX IP network diversity
MX IPs span 2 different /16 networks, providing good diversity.
SOA record parameters
Serial: 79520, Refresh: 10800s, Retry: 1080s, Expire: 2419200s, Min TTL: 900s
Attack Surface Findings
Non-routable IPv4 in public DNS: support.state.gov → 10.236.235.153
The subdomain support.state.gov resolves to non-routable IP 10.236.235.153, leaking internal network information.
💡 Remove non-routable IPs from public DNS or implement split-horizon DNS.
Weak DNSSEC RSA key: 336 bits
The DNSKEY uses an RSA key of 336 bits, below the recommended 2048 bits.
💡 Generate a new DNSKEY with at least 2048-bit RSA or migrate to ECDSA/Ed25519.
Weak DNSSEC RSA key: 336 bits
The DNSKEY uses an RSA key of 336 bits, below the recommended 2048 bits.
💡 Generate a new DNSKEY with at least 2048-bit RSA or migrate to ECDSA/Ed25519.
Weak DNSSEC RSA key: 336 bits
The DNSKEY uses an RSA key of 336 bits, below the recommended 2048 bits.
💡 Generate a new DNSKEY with at least 2048-bit RSA or migrate to ECDSA/Ed25519.
Domain enumerability: low
The domain has low enumerability. Proper NSEC3 configuration and limited CT exposure reduce the attack surface.
All MX records resolve correctly
No dangling MX records detected — all MX hostnames resolve to valid IP addresses.
Explicit MX records present
The domain has explicit MX records — no implicit A-record fallback delivery.
No excessive DNS information exposure detected
No HINFO, LOC, RP records, version disclosures, or zone walking vulnerabilities were found.
No email autodiscovery endpoints detected
No Microsoft Autodiscover, Mozilla Autoconfig, or email SRV records were found.
12 subdomain(s) discovered for state.gov
Subdomains were enumerated via Certificate Transparency logs, DNS wordlist brute-forcing, and DNS record analysis.
0 certificate(s) found in CT logs
Certificate Transparency logs contain 0 certificate(s) for state.gov and its subdomains. Each certificate reveals subdomain names.
NSEC3 authenticated denial of existence
The domain uses NSEC3 with 10 iteration(s) and salt '2B31'.
DNSSEC is enabled
DNSKEY and/or DS records are present, indicating DNSSEC is configured.
Reputation Findings
Could not retrieve TLS certificate
Failed to connect to state.gov:443 or retrieve the peer certificate.
💡 Ensure the domain has a valid TLS certificate installed and port 443 is accessible.
Missing domain locks: clientDeleteProhibited
Domain state.gov is missing protective locks: clientDeleteProhibited.
💡 Enable clientTransferProhibited and clientDeleteProhibited locks through your registrar to prevent unauthorized transfers or deletions.
Not listed on any DNS blacklists
Domain and MX IPs checked against 55 DNSBLs — no listings found.
Domain valid for 97 days
Domain state.gov expires on 2026-08-29.
No disposable email provider MX records
MX records for state.gov do not match known disposable email provider patterns.
Domain is 10460 days old
Domain state.gov was registered 1997-10-02.
No wildcard MX records
No wildcard MX records detected for state.gov.
TLD has good reputation
The .gov TLD is not on known abuse watchlists.
DMARC reporting destinations look legitimate
DMARC rua/ruf addresses do not point to known URL shortener services.
MX records point to stable infrastructure
No MX records point to known dynamic DNS service domains.
Strong TLS configuration on primary MX
Primary MX (christopher-ew.state.gov) uses TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 including Forward Secrecy.
SMTP banner matches infrastructure identity
The SMTP banner (stimson.state.gov) aligns with the MX hostname (stimson.state.gov).
No registered typosquat domains detected
None of the common typosquat mutations of this domain appear to be registered by third parties.
Google Safe Browsing DNS check — no flag detected
DNS-based Safe Browsing lookup returned no results. Full verification requires the Google Safe Browsing API key.
Abuse contacts found for MX IPs
Abuse contact information retrieved via abusix.org DNS lookup.
PhishTank — API key required
PhishTank phishing database check requires an API key.
Sender Score — API key required
Sender Score reputation check requires an API key.
Cisco Talos — API key required
Cisco Talos IP reputation check requires an API key.
Could not connect to state.gov
HTTPS request to https://state.gov failed or timed out.
Could not connect to webmail.state.gov
HTTPS request to https://webmail.state.gov failed or timed out.
WHOIS registration data
Registrar: get.gov | Created: 1997-10-02 | Expires: 2026-08-29 | Updated: 2025-11-18
WHOIS privacy protection enabled
Domain state.gov has WHOIS privacy/redaction enabled.
Bulletproof Hosting Detection — API key required
Checking IPs against known bulletproof hosting providers requires a threat intelligence API key.
Threat Intelligence Feeds — API key required
Checking domain against threat intelligence feeds requires API keys (e.g., VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB).
Dependency Chains
DMARC Authentication Chain (SPF)
DMARC uses SPF to verify that emails come from authorized servers
SPF Record
SPF record found and configured
→
DMARC Policy
DMARC policy: reject
DMARC Authentication Chain (DKIM)
DMARC uses DKIM to verify that emails have not been tampered with
DKIM Signature
DKIM signature missing
→
DMARC Policy
DMARC policy: reject
⚠️ DKIM signature is missing. DMARC relies on DKIM to verify email integrity and prevent tampering. Without DKIM, DMARC alignment will fail for cryptographic verification.
Mail Server Identity: stimson.state.gov
PTR record proves mail server legitimacy
MX: stimson.state.gov
Mail server at 169.252.4.131
→
PTR Record
Reverse DNS: stimson.state.gov
Mail Server Identity: christopher-ew.state.gov
PTR record proves mail server legitimacy
MX: christopher-ew.state.gov
Mail server at 169.253.162.11
→
PTR Record
Reverse DNS: listip.state.gov
Mail Server Reputation: stimson.state.gov
RBL check ensures server is not blacklisted
MX: stimson.state.gov
Mail server at 169.252.4.131
→
RBL Status
Not blacklisted
Mail Server Reputation: christopher-ew.state.gov
RBL check ensures server is not blacklisted
MX: christopher-ew.state.gov
Mail server at 169.253.162.11
→
RBL Status
Not blacklisted
Enforced Encryption Chain
MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks
TLS Support
Mail servers support TLS encryption
→
MTA-STS Policy
MTA-STS not configured
⚠️ MTA-STS policy is missing. Even with TLS support, you lack the enforcement layer that prevents attackers from stripping encryption (downgrade attacks).
Brand Identity Chain
BIMI displays your logo in email clients, but requires DMARC enforcement
DMARC Enforcement
DMARC policy: reject
→
BIMI Record
BIMI not configured
⚠️ BIMI record is missing. Even with DMARC enforcement, you need to configure BIMI to display your brand logo in supported email clients.
TLS Monitoring Chain
TLS-RPT provides reports about TLS connection failures
TLS Support
Mail servers support TLS encryption
→
TLS-RPT Reporting
TLS-RPT not configured
⚠️ TLS-RPT is not configured. Without TLS reporting, you have no visibility into TLS connection failures that may be impacting email delivery.
Security Checks
MX Records
✓
SPF Record
✓
DKIM Record
✗
DMARC Policy
✓
BIMI Record
✗
CAA Records
✗
DNSSEC
✓
MTA-STS
✗
TLS-RPT
✗
Embed Badge
Display your domain's security grade on your website or README:
<img src="https://scan.ractermx.com/badge/state.gov.svg" alt="Email Security Grade">
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