Identity
64
C
whitehouse.gov
Posture Score: 79/100
Scanned May 8, 2026 at 8:16 AM UTC
Attack Surface
80
Reputation
92
Identity Findings
No MX records found
The domain has no MX records and cannot receive email.
💡 Publish MX records pointing to your mail server(s).
Weak DKIM RSA key (~1296 bits) for selector 'mandrill'
RSA keys shorter than 2048 bits are considered weak. Current key is approximately 1296 bits.
💡 Generate a new 2048-bit (or larger) RSA key pair and update the DKIM record.
No MTA-STS record found
Without MTA-STS, mail transport encryption cannot be enforced and is vulnerable to downgrade attacks.
💡 Publish a _mta-sts TXT record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.whitehouse.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
No CAA records found
No CAA records are configured. Any certificate authority can issue certificates for this domain.
💡 Add CAA records to restrict certificate issuance. Example: 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
No TLS-RPT record found
Without TLS-RPT, you will not receive reports about TLS negotiation failures.
💡 Publish a _smtp._tls TXT record (e.g. "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@whitehouse.gov").
ARC check skipped — no MX records
Cannot assess ARC support without MX records.
Very low TTL on A record: 296s
The A record has a TTL of 296s or less (below 300s).
💡 Increase the TTL to at least 300 seconds unless frequent changes are expected.
Very low TTL on AAAA record: 296s
The AAAA record has a TTL of 296s or less (below 300s).
💡 Increase the TTL to at least 300 seconds unless frequent changes are expected.
NS TTL mismatch between parent and authoritative zone
The NS record TTL in the parent zone (~7195s) differs significantly from the authoritative zone (~86400s).
💡 Align NS record TTLs between the parent zone delegation and the authoritative zone.
SPF record is valid
The SPF record is properly configured with valid syntax and within lookup limits.
DKIM cryptographic configuration is compliant
No RFC 8301 compliance issues detected in DKIM key configuration.
No deprecated DMARCbis tags present
The DMARC record does not use any tags deprecated in DMARCbis (pct, rf, ri).
BIMI record is valid
BIMI is properly configured with a valid logo and DMARC enforcement.
IPv6 readiness is good
IPv6 records are present and properly configured.
NS delegation is properly configured
All nameservers are responsive, consistent, and properly secured.
DNS responses are consistent across all nameservers
All authoritative nameservers return consistent answers with proper AA flags.
DKIM2 not detected
No DKIM key record with v=2 was found across common selectors. DKIM2 is an emerging standard and not yet widely deployed.
DMARC alignment: adkim=r, aspf=r
DKIM alignment is relaxed, SPF alignment is relaxed.
DMARCbis np tag absent
The DMARC record does not include the np (non-existent subdomain policy) tag. Consider adding np=reject to protect non-existent subdomains under DMARCbis.
DMARCbis psd tag absent
The DMARC record does not include the psd (public suffix domain) indicator. Consider adding psd=n to explicitly identify this as an organizational domain.
DANE check skipped — no MX records
Cannot check DANE/TLSA without MX records.
Open relay check skipped — no MX records
Cannot test for open relay without MX records.
SMTP compliance check skipped — no MX records
Cannot test SMTP compliance without MX records.
Port exposure check skipped — no MX records
Cannot scan ports without MX records.
STARTTLS downgrade check skipped — no MX records
Cannot test STARTTLS without MX records.
RFC 8058 one-click unsubscribe assessment
DKIM signing is configured. RFC 8058 compliance depends on List-Unsubscribe and List-Unsubscribe-Post headers being included in outbound messages and DKIM signatures.
FCrDNS check skipped — no MX records
Cannot perform FCrDNS without MX records.
SOA record parameters
Serial: 2403559660, Refresh: 10000s, Retry: 2400s, Expire: 604800s, Min TTL: 1800s
Attack Surface Findings
NSEC records enable zone walking
The domain uses NSEC records for DNSSEC authenticated denial of existence. NSEC records can be walked to enumerate all names in the zone, effectively disclosing the entire zone contents.
💡 Switch from NSEC to NSEC3 with opt-out to prevent zone enumeration. Use NSEC3 with a random salt and sufficient iterations.
Domain enumerability: high
The domain is highly enumerable. Zone transfers, NSEC zone walking, or a combination of factors make it easy to discover all DNS records.
💡 Restrict zone transfers, use NSEC3 instead of NSEC, consider wildcard certificates to reduce CT log exposure, and implement rate limiting on DNS queries.
NSEC used instead of NSEC3 (zone enumeration possible)
The domain uses NSEC records for authenticated denial of existence. NSEC allows zone walking.
💡 Migrate from NSEC to NSEC3 to prevent zone enumeration.
No subdomain takeover risks detected
All checked subdomains have valid, responsive targets.
No internal information leakage detected
No non-routable IP addresses or internal references were found in public DNS records.
No email autodiscovery endpoints detected
No Microsoft Autodiscover, Mozilla Autoconfig, or email SRV records were found.
1 subdomain(s) discovered for whitehouse.gov
Subdomains were enumerated via Certificate Transparency logs, DNS wordlist brute-forcing, and DNS record analysis.
0 certificate(s) found in CT logs
Certificate Transparency logs contain 0 certificate(s) for whitehouse.gov and its subdomains. Each certificate reveals subdomain names.
DNSSEC is enabled
DNSKEY and/or DS records are present, indicating DNSSEC is configured.
Reputation Findings
Missing domain locks: clientTransferProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited
Domain whitehouse.gov is missing protective locks: clientTransferProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited.
💡 Enable clientTransferProhibited and clientDeleteProhibited locks through your registrar to prevent unauthorized transfers or deletions.
Not listed on any DNS blacklists
Domain and MX IPs checked against 55 DNSBLs — no listings found.
HSTS enabled with preload on whitehouse.gov
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000;includeSubdomains;preload
security.txt present
Found security.txt at https://whitehouse.gov/.well-known/security.txt.
TLS certificate valid for 51 days
Certificate for whitehouse.gov expires on 2026-06-28.
Certificate issued by E8
The certificate for whitehouse.gov is issued by a third-party CA.
Signature algorithm: ecdsa-with-sha384
The certificate for whitehouse.gov uses an acceptable signature algorithm.
ECC key: 256 bits
The certificate for whitehouse.gov uses an adequate ECC key of 256 bits.
SCTs present in certificate
The certificate for whitehouse.gov contains Signed Certificate Timestamps.
No weak ciphers detected
No known weak cipher suites detected on whitehouse.gov.
Domain valid for 131 days
Domain whitehouse.gov expires on 2026-09-17.
No disposable email provider MX records
MX records for whitehouse.gov do not match known disposable email provider patterns.
Domain is 10445 days old
Domain whitehouse.gov was registered 1997-10-02.
No wildcard MX records
No wildcard MX records detected for whitehouse.gov.
Google Safe Browsing DNS check — no flag detected
DNS-based Safe Browsing lookup returned no results. Full verification requires the Google Safe Browsing API key.
No abuse contacts resolved
Could not resolve abuse contact information for MX IPs via abusix.org.
PhishTank — API key required
PhishTank phishing database check requires an API key.
Sender Score — API key required
Sender Score reputation check requires an API key.
Cisco Talos — API key required
Cisco Talos IP reputation check requires an API key.
Could not connect to webmail.whitehouse.gov
HTTPS request to https://webmail.whitehouse.gov failed or timed out.
WHOIS registration data
Registrar: get.gov | Created: 1997-10-02 | Expires: 2026-09-17 | Updated: 2025-09-22
WHOIS privacy protection enabled
Domain whitehouse.gov has WHOIS privacy/redaction enabled.
Bulletproof Hosting Detection — API key required
Checking IPs against known bulletproof hosting providers requires a threat intelligence API key.
Threat Intelligence Feeds — API key required
Checking domain against threat intelligence feeds requires API keys (e.g., VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB).
Dependency Chains
DMARC Authentication Chain (SPF)
DMARC uses SPF to verify that emails come from authorized servers
SPF Record
SPF record found and configured
→
DMARC Policy
DMARC policy: reject
DMARC Authentication Chain (DKIM)
DMARC uses DKIM to verify that emails have not been tampered with
DKIM Signature
DKIM signature missing
→
DMARC Policy
DMARC policy: reject
⚠️ DKIM signature is missing. DMARC relies on DKIM to verify email integrity and prevent tampering. Without DKIM, DMARC alignment will fail for cryptographic verification.
Enforced Encryption Chain
MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks
TLS Support
TLS not verified or unsupported
→
MTA-STS Policy
MTA-STS not configured
⚠️ TLS support could not be verified. MTA-STS requires TLS to enforce encrypted connections. Without TLS, MTA-STS cannot function.
Brand Identity Chain
BIMI displays your logo in email clients, but requires DMARC enforcement
DMARC Enforcement
DMARC policy: reject
→
BIMI Record
Brand logo configured
TLS Monitoring Chain
TLS-RPT provides reports about TLS connection failures
TLS Support
TLS not verified or unsupported
→
TLS-RPT Reporting
TLS-RPT not configured
⚠️ TLS support could not be verified. TLS-RPT reports on TLS connection failures, but without TLS support, there's nothing to monitor. You need working TLS encryption before TLS-RPT can provide value.
Security Checks
MX Records
✗
SPF Record
✓
DKIM Record
✗
DMARC Policy
✓
BIMI Record
✓
CAA Records
✗
DNSSEC
✓
MTA-STS
✗
TLS-RPT
✗
Embed Badge
Display your domain's security grade on your website or README:
<img src="https://scan.ractermx.com/badge/whitehouse.gov.svg" alt="Email Security Grade">
Want to re-scan this domain for updated results?
Scan whitehouse.gov Again